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Abstract
The value of business planning has been subject to much controversy over the past years. In-
deed, there appears to be an escalation in empirical research, with opposing implications and 
diverging approaches to teaching entrepreneurship. Most empirical studies have taken an ex-
post, comparative view of the relationship between planning and performance. In this paper, 
we introduce an ex-ante perspective by formally characterizing the decision of the nascent 
entrepreneur whether or not to start a business and whether or not to plan beforehand. We 
focus on the evaluative function of business planning, define the information value of busi-
ness planning, identify its influencing factors, and show how costs of business planning de-
termine the quality of planning. We find as the crucial aspect of good evaluative business 
planning that it helps to identify and to sort out poor business ideas before they reach the mar-
ket. We contrast our results with conclusions drawn from empirical studies that have been 
critical of planning. In a setting in which, by construction, planning has a positive value, we 
question several popular negative implications by showing how they result from an incom-
plete sample of entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction
The value of business plans has been subject to much controversy in the literature over the 
past years, where different empirical samples have been used to investigate whether it is 
worthwhile for nascent entrepreneurs to “look before they leap,”1 i.e. plan the venture in ad-
vance, or simply to skip the planning, go ahead, and “just do it.”2 Proponents of planning re-
gard the business plan as a crucial prerequisite for creating a successful new venture.3 Critics, 
in contrast, doubt whether business planning is a worthwhile activity for new venture crea-
tion.4 The ongoing debate cannot be disregarded as purely academic, since it has far-reaching 
implications for how business plans are to be dealt with in practice, by those who are sup-
posed to write as well as those who are supposed to read them. 
While the majority of studies on this issue is empirical and generally takes an ex-post, com-
parative view of the relationship between planning and performance, we introduce in this pa-
per an ex-ante perspective and propose a theoretical framework that enables us to identify and 
measure the value of business planning, as seen by the relevant planner. Business planning 
preceding the start-up can be viewed as an information system that facilitates the entrepre-
neur’s decision to enter the market. Thus, our perspective is that of the nascent entrepreneur 
confronted with the decision on whether or not to start a business and whether or not to plan 
beforehand. The formal setting enables us to quantify the information value of business plan-
ning and to identify its influencing factors. Moreover, the structured decision model not only 
lets us see what the entrepreneur does, but also understand why he does it, which enables us to 
interpret empirical observations of entrepreneurial behavior and performance.5
It is important to distinguish between two qualitatively different kinds of business planning 
activities. In its basic form, the business plan is supposed to serve as an information instru-
ment, providing both the nascent entrepreneur and potential investors with quantifiable sce-
narios and an assessment of monetary consequences for the envisioned venture. Thus, the 
business plan comprises what Arora and Fosfuri (2005) refer to as “diagnostic information.” 
In terms of decision analysis, the set of strategies (or terminal actions) is given, and planning 
helps to improve an individual's assessment concerning the distribution of the outcome. Our 
1 Gruber et al. (2008). 
2 Lange et al. (2007). 
3 This has been the message of most entrepreneurship textbooks over the past decade. The persistence of this 
perspective can be seen in the various editions of prominent textbooks, e.g. by Hisrich et al. (2006) or Timmons 
and Spinelli (2007). 
4 cf. e.g. Bhidé (1994, 2003) or Lange et al. (2007). 
5 By linking the decision maker with the decision problem, the decision-analytic framework overcomes the di-
chotomy of what Eckhardt and Shane (2003) refer to as the “human-type” and the “opportunity-based” explana-
tions of entrepreneurship. 
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focus is on this type of business planning, regarded as a process dealing with analysis and 
assessment of a given business idea. Indeed, the bulk of the business-planning literature as 
well as the majority of entrepreneurship textbooks is focused mainly on this task. Here the 
leading topics are budgeting balance sheets and cash flow statements, opportunity analysis, 
SWOT analysis, market analysis, risks and rewards, etc., all of which have become important 
elements of standardized business plans, e.g. as they are seen at business-plan competitions. 
The quality of planning is then given by its reliability in assessing the venture’s market pros-
pects. For the entrepreneur, planning quality is characterized by the validity of the en- or dis-
couraging signals received from the analyses. 
On a more sophisticated level, business planning supports the development of an initial idea 
with potential value into a business venture with market potential. Business planning, in this 
sense, means creating and developing the business idea. In terms of decision analysis, new 
strategies are to be generated, thus enlarging the set of terminal actions. The value of the 
business plan is then to be measured by the prospective performance of the conceived busi-
ness. In particular with regard to this latter type of planning, i.e. the relationship between 
planning and performance, one finds the most disagreement among researchers. Delmar and 
Shane (2003), for example, reveal different channels, through which planning has a positive 
impact on the business venture.6 In contrast, Lange et al. (2007) find support for the hypothe-
sis that “new ventures launched with formal written business plans do not subsequently out-
perform ones launched without them.”7 Karlsson and Honig (2009) conclude from this debate 
that the empirical “research on the link between business planning and performance has, so 
far, been inconclusive.”8 Yet, Brinckmann et al. (2008) find in their meta-analysis of the vast 
empirical literature that the results do seem to point slightly in favor of planning.
In our view, the main reason for this continuing empirical controversy is a lack of distinction 
between evaluative and performance-enhancing business planning, leading the critics to draw 
their negative implications for business planning in general, thus throwing out the baby with 
the bath water.9 In our analysis, we, therefore, sidestep the debate by neglecting performance-
enhancing planning completely, in order to exclusively highlight the value of evaluative in-
formation activities and compare it to the information costs. 
6 See also Armstrong (1982), Castrogiovanni (1996), Shane and Delmar (2004), Gruber (2007), Gruber et al. 
(2008), and Kraus and Schwarz (2007) for further studies showing the different benefits of planning. 
7 Further prominent examples along this line include Bhidé (1994, 2003) and Honig and Karlsson (2004). 
8 As Arora and Fosfuri (2005) note, it is also theoretically difficult to put a value on states of nature that do not 
exist a priori. 
9 The importance of contextual differences in planning is emphasized by Castrogiovanni (1996).  
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Our analysis reveals that, from an ex-ante viewpoint, i.e. before starting the business, the main 
purpose of good evaluative business planning is to obtain reliable signals concerning the fu-
ture prospects of the planned venture and, thus, to reduce the probability of failure by keeping 
poor business ideas from reaching the market. Indeed, within our rational decision-making 
framework, the probability of terminating a project rises with the quality of planning, if the 
failure of a venture is a-priori more likely than its success. As a consequence, those carefully 
planned projects that do become start-ups justify higher expectations – not because planning 
affects their actual market performance, but simply due to their higher a-posteriori probability 
of success. Hence, planning may lead to rational start-up decisions that empirical analyses 
might misinterpret as entrepreneurial hubris,10 in particular when the venture has, a priori, a 
negative expected payoff. For funding institutions, the increase in expected value seems to be 
reason enough for demanding a business plan, regardless of whether or not it is thoroughly 
studied.11
We employ our decision model of the representative nascent entrepreneur to investigate the 
statistical implications of a population of rationally planning entrepreneurs. We intentionally 
construct a theoretical setting, in which the information value of business planning is unambi-
guously positive, to revisit recent empirical studies, in particular some which have come to 
the conclusion that business planning has no significant value. We show how different seem-
ingly negative implications of business planning can be derived when only a sub-tree of the 
complete entrepreneurial decision problem is taken into account. Empirical analyses focusing 
on only successful entrepreneurs neglect important information on reference groups, such as 
entrepreneurs that have failed or nascent entrepreneurs that have terminated their projects 
before entering the market. As a consequence, the conclusions are inevitably biased. Thus, 
while we do not doubt the empirical results, we question the strong negative implications that 
are drawn for business planning and entrepreneurial education. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we model and analyze the decision 
problem of a representative, rational, nascent entrepreneur, who is confronted with two choic-
es: One is whether or not he should initiate a new venture. The other is whether or not he 
should plan the business before making the market decision. In section 3, we define the in-
formation value of planning and show explicitly how it is related to the quality of planning. In 
10 Hayward et al. (2006) present a theory of entrepreneurial hubris which closely resembles the behavior of a 
rational decision maker, which we discuss below. 
11 From an insider perspective, Kawasaki (2004) claims that most venture capitalists require a business plan as 
proof of due diligence, but do not spend much time reading it. An explanation for this behavior is given by Cas-
trogiovanni (1996), who argues that planning is a signal for proactive learning, which has a positive impact on 
performance. 
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section 4 we acknowledge the costs of planning and discuss their effect on the entrepreneur’s 
decision to plan as well as the quality of planning. In section 5 we then revisit the empirical 
discussion on the value of planning and contrast well-known results with our theoretical 
model. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the implications of our results and possible 
extensions for further research. 
2. The Decision Problem of the Nascent Entrepreneur 
Consider the decision context of a representative entrepreneur planning a start-up. We con-
duct our analysis in the simplest possible setting in order to make our results transparent. For 
simplicity, we assume that the representative entrepreneur is risk neutral, since it does not 
matter for our subsequent results whether the decision maker is maximizing expected values 
or expected utilities. Business planning is an activity that the entrepreneur can choose to per-
form or else disregard. The sequential structure of the entrepreneur’s decision problem is de-
scribed by the decision tree depicted in Figure 1, where the squares, circles, and triangles de-
note decision, chance, and payoff nodes, respectively. Observe that the formal characteriza-
tion of the decision problem requires a precise timing of events. Since business planning helps 
to substantiate the consequences of action, it is natural to place the decision to plan (BP) be-
fore the decision to initiate the start-up. 
Consider first the lower branch in Figure 1, associated with the entrepreneur’s decision to 
implement the start-up without prior business planning (No BP). We assume that the imple-
mentation of the business idea in the form of a new venture requires an initial investment I,
where the returns of the investment are uncertain at the time when the investment decision is 
made. Without loss of generality, we reduce the more complex situation with multiple possi-
ble outcome scenarios to a setting with binary consequences and two states. With the prob-
ability  the start-up will generate a stream of future receipts, yielding a present 
value of which is higher than the initial investment I, such that the resulting net present 
value of  is positive. We, therefore, define the corresponding state as suc-
cess. With probability 1
0,1Sp 
SV
NPV  

0S SI V 	
Sp , the start-up will turn out as a failure, generating a lower present 
value of , such that the net present value is negative, i.e. FV 0F FNPV I V   

NPV
. We assume 
that the reference alternative to starting a business has a net present value of . Thus, 
the entrepreneur will choose to initiate the start-up if, and only if, the expected net present 
value of the start-up is positive, i.e. 
0 0
(1 ) 0S S S Fp V p V I   	 .
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Figure 1: The decision to plan before starting 
The upper branch (BP) in Figure 1 follows the entrepreneur’s decision to plan before starting 
the business. The purpose of business planning is to analyze the chances of initiating a suc-
cessful venture. Therefore, the entrepreneur expects to receive some signal regarding the 
prospects of the venture. For simplicity, we assume that business planning results in two al-
ternative signals, positive or negative. More generally, we could consider multiple alternative 
signals from business planning, without having this affect the qualitative results of our analy-
sis. In our view, a written business plan only documents the successful completion of plan-
ning. Hence, while every entrepreneur with a business plan is assumed to have planned, not 
every nascent planner – in particular those that terminate their project – will necessarily have 
a written business plan to show.12
After the signal is obtained from planning, the terminal actions are the same as before: On the 
one hand, the entrepreneur can choose the reference alternative, i.e. no start-up, yielding a net 
present value of zero. On the other hand, the entrepreneur can go ahead with the start-up, 
where the venture may turn out a success or a failure. Note that, in both cases, the present 
12 This corresponds to our practical experience with the facilitation of many start-ups over the past years, which 
typically begin with an idea that is developed, augmented by a business strategy, presented, assessed, and revised 
until the concept eventually converges to a business plan that can be written as one coherent text. The comple-
tion of the business plan very often coincides with the decision to enter the market, which matches the observa-
tion made by Liao and Gartner (2006). 
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value of the venture, i.e.,  or , is unaffected by business planning. We explicitly assume 
that planning does not affect the quality of the business idea, because our focus here is on the 
evaluative function of planning. Moreover, our main message concerning the value of busi-
ness planning is even enhanced, if our results are not driven by enhanced performance. 
SV FV
The essential difference between the upper and lower branch of the decision tree is that, if the 
signal from planning has any relevance, then the a-posteriori conditional probabilities of suc-
cess and failure will differ from the a-priori probabilities. The sole purpose of planning is to 
obtain some insight on the chances of success before making the decision to start. Therefore, 
we assume that the quality of planning is given by the likelihoods,  and , of being able 
to identify in advance successful or unsuccessful business ideas, respectively. These likeli-
hoods are given in Table 1, where ‘Success’ and ‘Failure’ characterize the actual ex-post re-
alization of the business idea, and ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ are the two alternative signals 
obtained from planning. 
Sq Fq
States
Success Failure
Positive Sq 1 Fq
Signals
Negative 1 Sq Fq
Table 1: The information structure 
One can consider different constellations of  and , reflecting whether it is easier to de-
tect a successful or an unsuccessful venture. However, when different levels of planning effort 
are taken into account, it seems reasonable to assume that changes of effort affect both likeli-
hoods qualitatively in the same way. For analytical convenience we, therefore, assume in the 
following that 
Sq Fq
 0,1S Fq q q   , as most of our results are not affected qualitatively by this 
simplification.
For his decision on whether or not he should enter the market, the entrepreneur is interested in 
the expected net present value of implementing the start-up. This critically depends on the 
probabilities of success and failure, conditional on the signal of business planning (cf. Figure 
1). How planning affects these probabilities is formalized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The a-posteriori probability of venture success is greater (less) than the a-
priori probability of success, if planning yields a positive (negative) signal and . 0.5q 	
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Moreover, the absolute difference between a-posteriori and a-priori probabilities rises with 
the quality of planning. 
Proof: Given our characterization of planning quality in Table 1, we can calculate the a-
posteriori (conditional) probabilities with Bayes’ rule, yielding 
(1) P(Success|Positive) ,
(1 )(1 )

  
S
S S
qp
qp q p
where , and P(Failure|Positive) 1 P(Success|Positive) 
(2)
(1 )
P(Success|Negative) ,
(1 ) (1 )


  
S
S S
q p
q p q p
where P(Failure|Negative) 1 P(Success|Negative). 
In order to prove the first part of the statement, note that both P(Success|Positive) Sp	  and 
P(Success|Negative) Sp
  hold for . The second part of the statement follows from the 
differentiation of the conditional probabilities in equations (1) and (2) with respect to q.
0.5q 	

Proposition 1 provides a rational explanation for the observation made by Cooper et al. 
(1988), stating that most entrepreneurs (68%) “perceived their odds for success as better than 
others” in a similar business. If an entrepreneur entering the market perceives his own odds 
for success as P(Success|Positive) with the general odds given by P(Success)  Sp , the dif-
ference in perception in the present setting might simply be the logical consequence of plan-
ning, having nothing to do with cognitive dissonance, hubris, or other psychological as-
pects.13 According to the research agenda of Shane and Venkataraman (2000), one of basic 
questions of entrepreneurship is “why some people and not other exploit opportunities.” A 
simple but rational explanation could be that some people are just better in assessing the pros-
pects of ventures than others. The deviation of the conditional probabilities in Proposition 1 
from their a-priori values also offers a rational explanation for why Townsend et al. (2008) 
find that the a-priori probability of success (referred to as ‘outcome expectancy’) loses its 
relevance for influencing the entrepreneur’s decision to initiate the venture, once the entrepre-
neur’s quality of planning (belonging to what the authors refer to as ‘ability expectancy’) is 
taken into account. 
                                                
13 See also Hayward et al. (2006). 
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From the denominators of the conditional probabilities in equations (1) and (2) we can di-
rectly infer the probabilities of the two planning signals,  
(3) P(Positive) (1 )(1 )S Sqp q p     and 
(4) P(Negative) (1 ) (1 )S Sq p q p    .
Note that the two probabilities given in equations (3) and (4) are endogenously determined. 
Hence, the explanatory quality of our theoretical model will depend on how well these values 
correspond to empirical estimates. We return to this issue in Section 5. 
3. The Information Value of Business Planning 
With the formal characterization of the entrepreneur’s decision situation, we can now derive 
the information value of business planning. More specifically, the relationship between the 
information value and the quality of planning is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: The information value of business planning is positive, if a positive signal in-
duces the entrepreneur to initiate and a negative signal induces the entrepreneur to terminate 
the start-up. Moreover, the positive information value is a monotonically increasing affine 
function of the quality of planning.
Proof: A positive signal induces the entrepreneur to initiate the start-up, if the expected value 
of entering the market is greater than zero, i.e. the value of staying out. With the conditional 
probabilities P(Success|Positive) and P(Failure|Positive) from Proposition 1, the critical con-
dition is 
Pos
(1 )(1 )
( ) ( )
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )( )
:  .
( ) (1 )( )
0
 
     	
     
 
 	 
   
S S
S F
S S S S
S F
S S S F
qp q pI V I V
qp q p qp q p
p I Vq q
p V I p I V
A negative signal induces the entrepreneur to terminate the start-up, if the value of staying out 
of the market is greater than the expected value of entering. With the conditional probabilities 
P(Success|Negative) and P(Failure|Negative), the critical condition is 
Neg
(1 ) (1 )
( ) ( )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
( )
:  .
( ) (1 )( )
0
 
     

     

 	 
   
S S
S F
S S S S
S S
S S S F
q p q pI V I V
q p q p q p q p
p V Iq q
p V I p I V
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Thus, if the quality of planning exceeds the minimum level min Pos Neg: max{ , }q q q , the entre-
preneur will initiate the start-up after receiving a positive signal and terminate the project after 
receiving a negative signal.14 The expected value of the venture with business planning, 
 prior to receiving a signal, is then given by ( )BPNPV q
 
 
( ) P(Positive) P(Success|Positive) P(Failure|Positive)
(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( )  .
BP S F
S F S S S F
NPV q V V I
p I V p V I p I V q
 
        

The information value of business planning, , is given by the difference between the 
expected value of the venture with planning, , and the expected value of the ven-
ture (starting or terminate the business) without planning, . Depending on the sign of the 
expected net present value of starting without planning, is positive or zero, i.e. 
( )BP q
BPNPV ( )q
NPV
NPV
 max 0; (1 )S S S FNPV p V p V I    , so that there are two cases to consider: 
i. : Here the advantage of planning is to stop seemingly unsuccess-
ful ventures, and Neg q , such that 
(1 ) 0   	S S S Fp V p V I
minq min( ) (1 )BP S S S FNPV q p V p V I    , which is just 
the expected value of starting without planning. The information value of planning is then 
given by 
(5)
  min
min
( ) ( ) (1 )( ) 0 ,  for 
( )
 0 ,                                                                            for .
S S S S S F
BP
p V I p V I p I V q q q
q
q q

         


ii. : Here the advantage of planning is to start seemingly successful 
ventures, and min Pos
(1 ) 0   
S S S Fp V p V I
q q , such that min 0( )BPNPV q  , which is just the expected value of 
terminating the project without planning. The information value of planning is then given 
by
(6)
  min
min
(1 )( ) ( ) (1 )( ) 0 ,  for 
( )
 0 ,                                                                                   for .
S F S S S F
BP
p I V p V I p I V q q q
q
q q

          


In both cases, the positive information value is a monotonically increasing, affine function of 
the quality of planning. 

Pos Negmin{ , }
 q
14 For completeness, one must also acknowledge the case, where q is so low, that the entrepreneur does exactly 
the opposite of what planning recommends – if the signal is positive, the entrepreneur stays out of the market, 
and if it is negative, he enters the market. In the proof of Proposition 1, this is the case where q q .
We regard this case as a technical peculiarity of the model and ignore it in the following analysis. 
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Proposition 2 is depicted in Figure 2, which shows the graphic characterization of equations 
(5) and (6), associated with the two cases i. and ii., respectively. Note that in case ii. of Propo-
sition 2 the nascent entrepreneur would not start the business without planning, because the a-
priori expected net present value is negative. Nevertheless, for a sufficiently high quality of 
planning, i.e. , the rational entrepreneur will initiate the venture, if he receives a posi-
tive signal. Again, this behavior has nothing to do with over-confidence, although the sole 
observation of the entrepreneur’s entering the market might suggest otherwise.
minq q	
15
min Neg
min Pos
i)
ii) 


q q
q q
( )BP q
q
10.5
i)   (1 )( )
ii)   ( )
 

S F
S S
p I V
p V I
Figure 2: The information value of business planning 
As Figure 2 shows, planning requires a minimum level of quality, , in order to be of any 
positive value to the entrepreneur. This minimum level sensitively depends on the parameters 
of the venture which is at stake. 
minq
Corollary 1: The minimum quality for a positive information value of business planning is 
determined by the a-priori expected net present value of the venture. In particular, , 
and the higher the absolute a-priori expected net present value is, the higher  must be. 
min 0.5q 
minq
Proof: From the proof of Proposition 1, one can infer that the critical levels of planning qual-
ity, , are related through the conditions Pos Neg,q q
Neg Pos
(1 )
1   and   
( ) (1 )(
S S S F
Neg Pos
S S S F
p V p V Iq q q q
)p V I p I V
  
   
   
.
15 cf. Hayward et al. (2006). 
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Hence, Posq  and  are symmetric around 0.5, implying that . Moreover, the 
minimum quality, 
Negq
min
min 0.5q
,: max{ }Pos Negq q q , rises with p (1 )S S S FV p V I   .

Intuitively, the more the a-priori expected net present value of the start-up deviates from the 
net present value of the reference alternative ( 0 0NPV  ) in either direction, the more critical 
the quality of planning becomes in order to evoke a relevant stop-or-go signal. Indeed, if the 
quality of planning falls below ,minq
16 then the signal that the entrepreneur receives is too 
imprecise to yield distinguishable implications. One can easily verify that, after having re-
ceived such a low-quality signal, the entrepreneur will do whatever he would do without plan-
ning, implying that planning has no information value for the entrepreneur. 
In order to fully acknowledge the impact of business planning, consider the following nu-
merical example of a representative entrepreneur: The necessary investment in the venture is 
given by , where the successful venture yields a present value of 
and a failure results in . The a-priori probability of success is given by 
. Nevertheless, the net present value of the start-up without planning is 
 (this is case i. of Proposition 2), implying that the risk-
neutral entrepreneur would initiate the venture, although the odds for success are very low.
200,000I
)  S Fp V I
n 0.60
800,000SV
100,000FV
,000 0	
0.20Sp
(1S Sp V
miq
40
17
With  determined by the parameters of the venture, assume that the entrepreneur 
has the possibility of planning with a quality 0.75q   (i.e. in three out of four cases planning 
will reveal the ex-post actual performance). The effect on the entrepreneur’s decision can be 
seen by applying the values of our example to the decision problem of Figure 1. The result is 
shown in Figure 3. 
Remarkably, for the individual entrepreneur who chooses to plan, the probability of a success-
ful start-up increases by 115% from 0.20Sp   to P(Success|Positive) 0.43 , while the prob-
ability of failure drops by almost 30% from 1 0.80Sp  P(Failure|Positiv to , after 
receiving a positive signal, thus increasing the expected outcome of the venture. The value of 
this planning quality, i.e. the information value of business planning, according to equation 
e) 0.57
Pos Negmin{ , } 0.5q q q
 

16 Again, we ignore the case where .
17 Note also that the decision can be motivated without having to refer to hubris (cf. Hayward et al. (2006)).  
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(5) of Proposition 2, is . This is the amount the risk-neutral entrepreneur 
would be willing to pay for business planning with a quality of 
(0.75) 30,000BP 
0.75q  .
However, there are several other noteworthy effects. In the process of planning with ,
the nascent entrepreneur is quite likely (with a probability of 65%) to terminate his project. 
With a probability of only 35%, the nascent will actually enter the market to become an entre-
preneur.
0.75q 
0.20
18 Moreover, as a founder with a business plan, the entrepreneur will still quite likely 
(with a probability of 57%) fail. Hence, the planning entrepreneur, ex ante, only has a 15% 
chance (0.35×0.43) of being successful, which is lower than the probability ( ) of 
implementing a successful venture without planning, because planning entails the risk of in-
correctly disbanding a good project.
Sp
Figure 3: The decision problem of the entrepreneur with a planning quality of q = 0.75 
More important, though, is the other side of the coin, as business planning also generates a 
lower probability of failure. In our example, the ex-ante probability of failure for the planning 
entrepreneur is only 20% (0.35×0.57). Compared with the 80% chance of failure without 
planning, this is a considerable improvement. Formally, we obtain the following result. 
18 It is this capability of sorting out the many poor and detecting the few good ideas that Bhidé (1994) finds to be 
characteristic for successful entrepreneurs. 
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Proposition 3: If business planning is less than perfect, it will reduce the entrepreneur’s 
chances of implementing a successful start-up. However, if planning has a positive value, the 
chances of implementing a failure will be reduced relatively more. 
Proof: According to equations (1) and (3), the probability of success for an entrepreneur with 
a business plan is given by P(Positive)×P(Success|Positive) Sqp . If planning is less than 
perfect ( ), the chance of success falls below the a-priori probability (without planning), 1q 

Sp , because a potentially profitable venture may be incorrectly sorted out. Accordingly, from 
equations (2) and (4), P(Po )Spsitive)×P(Failure|Positive) (1 )(1q   , which is also lower 
than 1 Sp . Yet, with , the reduction in the probability of failure is relatively 
greater than the reduction in the probability of success. 
min 0.5	q q

4. The Costs of Business Planning 
The information value of planning that we analyzed in the previous section was defined as the 
expected benefits of planning minus the expected benefits of not planning. As we showed in 
Figure 2, the information value rises with the quality of planning. Consequently, the entrepre-
neur should aim for the highest planning quality, yielding a perfect signal concerning the suc-
cess of the venture. Yet, there are also costs of planning, which we have neglected in our pre-
vious analysis. Planning costs time, effort, or money, and one may assume that these costs 
increase with the quality of planning. In the following, we assume that the quality dependent 
costs of planning are characterized by the function    
 : 0.5,1 ,   with (0.5) 0,  '( ) 0,  and ''( ) 0C C C q 	 	 C q 	
q
.
Business planning might entail fixed costs, e.g. given by the necessity of basic planning mate-
rials, such as books, spreadsheets, templates, check lists, etc. In addition, there are quality 
dependent variable costs that are increasing at increasing marginal costs.19 The corresponding 
cost function is shown in Figure 4. 
By comparing the costs with the information value one obtains the net benefit of planning, 
. The relationship between the three corresponding curves is illustrated 
in Figure 4. If there exists a range of planning quality, over which the net value of planning is 
positive, then the optimal quality of planning, , is determined by the maximum net value.  
( ) : ( ) ( )BPq q C  
*q
19 Gruber (2007) explicitly acknowledges the costs of planning, relating these to the time spent on planning. 
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However, if the costs of planning are so high that they exceed the information value for all 
levels of , then the nascent entrepreneur will abstain from planning and has two pos-
sible choices. If the a-priori expected net present value is positive ( ),
the entrepreneur will start without planning. Otherwise, if faced with a negative expected net 
present value ( ), he will refrain from starting a business altogether. 
minq q	
p V
(1 ) 0   	S S S Fp V p V I
(1 ) 0S S S Fp V I   

( )C q
( )BP q
q
10.5 *qminq
( ) q
Figure 4: The costs of planning and the optimal planning quality 
Applied to a population of nascent entrepreneurs, the absolute costs of business planning have 
a significant impact not only on the number of entrepreneurs who choose to plan, but also on 
the number of start-ups. In addition, the (marginal) costs determine the quality of planning 
and, thereby, the value of planning as well.
The question of whether or not planning is useful is beside the point. As we have shown in the 
previous section, relevant planning is always useful for a rational decision maker, if it is cost-
less. The crucial aspect, highlighted in this section, is whether or not the usefulness of plan-
ning exceeds its costs. If a rational entrepreneur – and there is no convincing evidence that 
justifies the assumption of an irrational entrepreneur20 – decides to plan, the value of planning 
must be higher than the associated costs. With this point in mind, we turn next to empirical 
studies that have investigated the usefulness of business planning. 
20 Wu and Knott (2006) even assume rationality when considering entrepreneurial traits that are related to over-
confidence. 
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5. Empirical Implications of the Rational Decision Model 
The clear-cut theoretical results that we have obtained concerning the value of planning may 
appear somewhat surprising in the light of the controversy over the observable value of plan-
ning, which has developed over the past years. In this section we, therefore, contrast our ana-
lytical results with findings from empirical studies, in particular also those studies that have 
been critical of business planning. 
5.1. Observations Concerning Business Planners 
We first generalize the decision problem of the representative individual entrepreneur to a 
population of identical entrepreneurs in order to interpret the probabilities as “statistics,” 
which are generated in a decision context, in which planning, by assumption, has an unambi-
guously positive value. We continue to use the numerical example, illustrated in Figure 3. 
It is important to stress that the numerical values for the signals’ probabilities, P(Positive) and 
P(Negative), are endogenously determined by the decision model, in particular by the values 
for the a-priori probability of success and the quality of planning. If we apply these probabili-
ties to a population of identical nascent entrepreneurs, we obtain the following result. 
Proposition 4: If venture success is, a-priori, less likely than failure  and planning 
has a positive value, then only a minority of those nascent entrepreneurs, who plan their 
businesses, will end up entering the market.
( 0.Sp 
 5)
Proof: Only a minority of planning nascent entrepreneurs will enter the market, if 
      P(Positive) P(Negative)
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 2 )(1 ) (1 2 )         
1 1
                       for  .
2 2
S S S
S S
S
qp q p q p q p
q p q p
p q
S


    
   
   
 
 
 	
With  this always holds, if success is a priori less likely than failure.  minq q	

Hence, when our numerical example is generalized to a population of planning nascent entre-
preneurs, we see that, on average, only 35% enter the market. With the underlying parameter 
values, the endogenous share is well in line with empirical estimates. Indeed, Åstebro (1998) 
reports different studies showing that significantly less than 50% of nascent entrepreneurs 
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succeed in starting a new firm. These values also correspond to our own day-to-day experi-
ence with university start-ups, where approximately 1/3 of our 250 planning nascent entrepre-
neurs over the past three years have entered the market.  
Critics of business planning complain that planning is time consuming and just keeps entre-
preneurs from starting their business.21 As our analysis reveals, there is a good reason for this: 
Good planning helps keep poor business ideas from the market. Indeed, in the light of Propo-
sition 4, it appears cynical to urge nascent entrepreneurs to start without planning. 
Proposition 4 may also explain why Honig and Karlsson (2004) find that, among nascents 
with a business education (indicating their openness towards business planning), the propen-
sity to produce business plans is (surprisingly) low. However, in their study, terminated pro-
jects are not counted as planned, but simply as failed ventures, i.e. only market entrants with 
business plans count. As our example reveals, if planning is valuable and exceeds its costs, 
then all nascent entrepreneurs will rationally choose to plan, but the majority will terminate 
their projects, because of the negative signals they receive. Hence, from the observation of 
market entries alone, it is premature to conclude that of those nascent entrepreneurs, who 
could plan, only a minority will choose to do so. 
The empirical evidence against business planning is obtained in different ways. One method 
is to study entrepreneurs that enter the market with business plans, in order to investigate what 
they do with their plans and how well they do with their business. With regard to the second 
question, it is of particular interest to see how they compare to entrepreneurs without a busi-
ness plan. For example, Karlsson and Honig (2009) derive their pessimistic view of business 
planning from a sample of six incubator start-ups, of which the four with a business plan all 
fail. However, since this practice involves only a sub-sample of all nascent entrepreneurs, the 
empirical results may be misleading as the following result shows. 
Proposition 5: If planning is less than perfect and venture success is, a-priori, less likely than 
failure , then the majority of all entrepreneurs, who have a business plan before 
entering the market, may fail.
( 0.Sp 
 5)
p
Proof: From equations (1) and (3) one can infer for a population of identical nascent entrepre-
neurs that the majority of planners who enter the market will fail, if 
(1 )(1 )
1 .
S S
S
q p q
q p
  	
  

21 e.g. Lange et al. (2007).  
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As long as , i.e. planning is less than perfect, and 1q 
 0.5Sp 
 , i. e. success is, a-priori, less 
likely than failure, the above condition is possible. However, as long as , the 
value of planning will remain positive. 
min 0.5q q	 

From Proposition 5 we can, thus, conclude that, for any sample of entrepreneurs with a busi-
ness plan, the value of business planning cannot be inferred from the share of entrepreneurs 
that are successful. In other words, a negative correlation between business planning and mar-
ket success in a sample of entrepreneurs with business plans tells us nothing about the value 
of business plans.
Propositions 4 and 5 both assume that, a priori, success is less likely than failure. The empiri-
cal evidence concerning the underlying a-priori probability of success, Sp , is mixed. Accord-
ing to Headd (2003), the widespread belief that business failure is very high seems to be re-
lated to the official statistics on business closures, which are often misinterpreted as failures. 
He points to independent statistics revealing that up to 75% of start-ups survive the first two 
years, indicating a high value of Sp , while after six years 40% are still in business, i.e. less 
than half. Brüderl et al. (1992) identify several influencing factors for firm failure, the mortal-
ity rate being highest within the first year. However, even after five years more than 60% of 
the start-ups they studied were still in business. Strotmann (2007) obtains similar values, but 
also finds that less than half are still around after ten years. Åstebro (1998) holds a more pes-
simistic view, finding that less than half survive at least four years. 
For our numerical example we chose a rather low value of 0.2Sp  , mainly to demonstrate 
the rationality of entering the market, even when the odds for a successful venture are very 
low. However, since venture failure in our setting only refers to a negative net present value, 
rather than insolvency, we believe that a low value of 0.5Sp 
  can be justified even for 
shorter time horizons. In any case the a-priori probability of success will depend on the nature 
and environment of the start-up project, as well as the time horizon under consideration. 
5.2. Observations Concerning Business Planning Quality 
As we have shown in Section 3, a crucial aspect of business planning is that it helps keep en-
trepreneurs with bad ideas from entering the market. Therefore, one might assume that better 
business planning should be even more effective in preventing bad business ideas. The fol-
lowing proposition provides a formal statement on this issue. 
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Proposition 6: A higher planning quality makes positive (negative) signals more likely, if, 
and only if, the a-priori probability of success is higher (lower) than the probability of failure. 
Proof: By differentiating the probability of receiving a positive signal with respect to the 
quality of planning, we obtain 
 P(Positive)
2 1 0      0.5S S
d p p
dq
    .

When planning is valuable, P(Positive) becomes the probability of implementing the start-up, 
while P(Negative) characterizes the probability of termination. Hence, Proposition 6 directly 
links the quality of planning to the entrepreneur’s start-up decision. Whether higher planning 
quality increases the entrepreneur’s propensity to enter the market or to disband the project 
sensitively depends on the a-priori probability of success. 
It is interesting to compare Proposition 6 with the study of Delmar and Shane (2003), who 
find empirically that (better) business planning reduces the hazard of disbanding the ven-
ture.22 In a similar vein, Townsend et al. (2008) find strong empirical evidence that the deci-
sion to initiate the start-up is positively related to entrepreneurs’ ability expectancy. Accord-
ing to Proposition 6, these results can rationally be expected for ventures that, a priori, are 
more likely to succeed than to fail. However, with an a-priori probability of success lower 
than 0.5, better planning will induce more nascent entrepreneurs to terminate their projects.  
If planning quality rises with the time spent on planning, these results also explain why longer 
planning may reduce the entrepreneur’s propensity to initiate the start-up. According to 
Townsend et al. (2008), a longer time spent on planning reduces the entrepreneur’s outcome 
expectancy, because windows of opportunity close if the start-up is delayed. From a different 
angle, Proposition 6 states that, if outcome expectancy ( Sp ) is low to begin with, then longer 
planning will increase the nascent entrepreneur’s probability of receiving a negative signal 
and, therefore, terminating the project. 
While Proposition 6 relates the quality of planning to the individual entrepreneur’s start-up 
decision, we can also apply this statement to a population of planning entrepreneurs to imme-
diately obtain the following implication. 
22 One must acknowledge, though, the different functions of business planning. While our focus here is purely on 
business analysis, Delmar and Shane (2003) focus their study more on business development. So there may actu-
ally be two complementary or counteracting effects at work. 
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Corollary 2: If for all nascent entrepreneurs the a-priori probability of success is higher 
(lower) than the probability of failure, then an increase in the quality of planning will lead to 
an increase (a reduction) in the number of start-ups. 
Corollary 2 has important implications for the support and promotion of start-ups, because it 
reveals that, in an environment with less-promising start-up projects, i.e. where , the 
improvement of business planning, e.g. through training, coaching, or support tools, may con-
flict with the objective to create more start-ups. This can become frustrating for facilitators 
that are typically judged by the number of successful start-ups they have supported, rather 
than by the number of venture failures that they could prevent. 
0.5Sp 

5.3. Observations Concerning Successful Entrepreneurs 
In order to broaden our discussion, we next construct a hypothetical world of planning and 
non-planning entrepreneurs. Consider a start-up environment consisting of n nascent entre-
preneurs. We impose the assumption of rationality, so that all entrepreneurs would plan their 
business, if planning yields a positive information value. Indeed, Lange et al. (2007) found 
that the entrepreneurs, surveyed in their study, stated strategic planning as the most important 
purpose of business plans.23 Thus, the only reason for an entrepreneur not to plan is that the 
process of planning is too costly. In order to strengthen our arguments, we assume further that 
the expected net present value is positive for all n entrepreneurs, i.e. ,
so that planning is not a necessity for starting a venture. Indeed, if the a-priori net present 
value of the project were negative, one could argue that the entrepreneur is forced to rede-
velop the project. However, we excluded this type of planning from our analysis, to avoid 
giving planning an exogenous benefit. 
(1 ) 0   	S S S Fp V p V I
Suppose that a fraction [0,1] 
(LC
 of the n nascent entrepreneurs has sufficiently low quality-
dependent planning costs of , enabling them to optimally plan with quality ,
while the rest are confronted with planning costs , which are too high to ensure a posi-
tive net benefit of planning for any level of . Hence, we are considering a world in which 
planning is possible for some entrepreneurs and by construction has an unambiguously posi-
tive value. 
)q minq q	
( )HC q
q
23 According to Lange et al. (2007), the four most important purposes of business plans stated by entrepreneurs 
were: 1. Strategic planning, 2. Articulate business model, 3. Financial planning, 4. Operations planning. 
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Of the first group of (planning) nascent entrepreneurs, some will receive a positive signal 
from planning, which encourages them to initiate their start-up. In contrast, those business 
planners, who receive a negative signal, will prefer to terminate their projects. Of the plan-
ners, who finally enter the market, some will be successful and some will fail. In the second 
group, all entrepreneurs initiate their start-ups without planning. In this group as well, some 
will be successful, while others will fail. 
The different events described above are shown in Figure 5, where we have included the 
number of nascent entrepreneurs affected by the individual events, using the notation of the 
preceding sections. In addition, in order to provide a numerical example (characterized by the 
bold numbers in Figure 5), suppose that there are n=10,000 nascent entrepreneurs, of whom 
all are faced with a 20% a-priori chance of success. The majority of these entrepreneurs 
( 0.55  ) wish to plan their business, due to sufficiently low planning costs, where business 
planning is conducted with optimal quality, which we, again, assume to be .0.75q 
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Figure 5: The relationship between business planning and success 
The first observation is related to the widespread practice of studying the traits, decisions, etc. 
of only successful entrepreneurs, mainly because the unsuccessful ones are not available, and 
then drawing far-reaching implications from the statistically significant observations. 
Proposition 7: Even if the majority of nascent entrepreneurs plan their businesses, the major-
ity of successful entrepreneurs may nevertheless start their venture without a business plan, if 
planning is less than perfect.
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Proof: The share of successful entrepreneurs without a business plan is higher than the share 
of entrepreneurs with a business plan if 
(1 ) S Sp n qp n  	
1
1 q
 


.
Hence, as long as planning is less than perfect, i.e. 1q 
 ,  possible that, even with 0.5 it is  	 ,
ber of counted successful entrepreneurs without a business plans exceeds the number 
of those entrepreneurs with a business plan. 
the num

Consider our example shown in Figure 5. Of the 10,000 nascent entrepreneurs in the “sam-
ple”, observe that 55% decide to plan their business. Of these planners, 825 turn out to be 
successful. Of the 45% nascents who “just do it”, i.e. start without planning, e.g. as Lange et 
al. (2007) would advise, 900 are successful. The latter make up 52% of the total of 1,725 suc-
cessful entrepreneurs. Thus, while the majority of nascent entrepreneurs plan before starting, 
the majority of (ex-post) successful entrepreneurs start without a plan. On the surface it seems 
that this sample would not make a strong case for business planning. However, this “observa-
tion” is made in an environment in which planning has an unambiguously positive value. 
From Proposition 7 we can conclude that, for any sample of only successful entrepreneurs, the 
value of business planning cannot be inferred from the share of entrepreneurs with a business 
plan. For example, Honig and Karlsson (2004) find in their empirical study of nascent entre-
preneurs that “survival” (in our context “success”) seems to be unrelated to business planning. 
Proposition 7 shows how careful one must be in interpreting empirical characteristics of suc-
cessful entrepreneurs and in drawing conclusions with respect to the value of business plan-
ning.24
As we have shown above in Proposition 4, business planning keeps entrepreneurs from start-
ing their business, which is often wrongly criticized. However, there is a further argument, 
stated in the following proposition, which does seem to speak against business planning. 
24 Although we have, by assumption, excluded the positive influence of business planning on economic perform-
ance, one should be equally cautious in contesting this influence empirically on the basis of samples of only 
successful entrepreneurs (e.g. Bhidé (1994), Honig and Karlsson (2004) and Lange et al. (2007)). A similar ca-
veat is justified for the observation of Allinson et al. (2000) that intuition rather than analytical planning best 
characterizes successful entrepreneurs, as types were not considered. 
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Proposition 8: If some entrepreneurs write a business plan when planning is less than per-
fect, then the total number of successful entrepreneurs is lower than when all entrepreneurs 
enter the market without planning.
Proof: Without any planning, the number of successful entrepreneurs is given by Sp n . With 
some entrepreneurs planning, there are two types of successful entrepreneurs, those with a 
business plan, , and those without a business plan, (Sqp n 1 ) S p n . Since
(1 ) ( 1) for 1 ,S S S S Sqp n  p n q p n p n p n q     
 

business planning reduces the number of successful entrepreneurs, if planning is less than 
perfect, i.e. .1q 


Formally, Proposition 8, stated for a population of planning and non-planning entrepreneurs, 
is an extension of Proposition 3, referring to the individual planner. In our example, if all nas-
cent entrepreneurs would enter the market without planning, the statistics would reveal 2,000, 
i.e. 20%, successful entrepreneurs. However, observe in Figure 5 that there are only 1,725 
successful entrepreneurs. As one can see, the loss of 275 successful ventures is only the result 
of business planning. Intuitively, if planning does not achieve perfect forecasts, some poten-
tially successful ventures will be discarded. 
From Proposition 8 we can conclude that, for any sample of nascent entrepreneurs, the value 
of business planning cannot be inferred from the effect on the share of successful entrepre-
neurs. In order to obtain a complete picture, one must also look at the failures. In our example, 
in Figure 5, a total of 4,700 ventures fail, which is considerably less than the 8,000 failures 
that one would expect in an environment without any planning. Thus, while less than perfect 
planning inevitably reduces the number of successful ventures, the number of failures drops 
even more. This undisputable benefit of business planning is typically neglected by all em-
pirical studies that exclude failures. 
6. Conclusions
The widespread controversy over the value of business planning within the entrepreneurship 
research community over the past years does not seem to be coming to a settlement. To the 
contrary, one might even sense an escalation in empirical research with opposing implica-
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tions, leading to different schools of thought and, consequently, diverging approaches to 
teaching entrepreneurship. 
The purpose of this paper was to provide an analytical framework in order to provide, first, a 
precise definition of the value of planning and, second, an understanding of how it is affected 
in and by the entrepreneurial process. Since planning typically precedes doing, we focused on 
the ex-ante informational value of assessing the prospects of a given venture.
In addition to the evaluative function of business planning that we explored in the previous 
sections, one can also view business planning as the development of a business idea or strat-
egy. However, we refrained from including this important strategic function of business plan-
ning for several reasons. First, we believe that the strategic development of a strong business 
concept requires a more sophisticated analysis than the evaluation of a given business idea. 
This advanced planning goes beyond the standardized concepts underlying most books on 
business planning, software packages, and templates for business plan competitions. More-
over, in terms of planning quality, strategic planning occurs at a higher, more costly, and as of 
yet less standardized level than evaluative planning. Finally, the information value of plan-
ning that we revealed in our analysis was driven only by the enhanced a-posteriori probability 
of success. Had we also included the enhanced value of a successful start-up through strategic 
planning of a better business idea, our results would have been even stronger. Yet, it would be 
more difficult to distinguish between the driving forces behind our conclusions, which would 
have obscured the message of our analysis. 
Business planning has a positive value even if it has absolutely no measureable effect on the 
ex-post observable performance of the actual venture. The evaluative function of planning has 
its impact before market entry, as it helps to avoid poor start-ups – its value is measured by 
the ex-ante expected performance. Hence, empirical analyses studying only the performance 
of (often only successful) entrepreneurs that have entered the market simply do not have a 
sufficient sample for deducing implications on the evaluative value of planning.
In order to emphasize the latter point, we used our theoretical framework to derive observa-
tions from a hypothetical world, in which planning has an unambiguously positive value. This 
enabled us to provide answers to several open questions concerning the behavior of entrepre-
neurs. In particular, we were able to demonstrate that the rational decision model is quite use-
ful in explaining entrepreneurial decisions, without having to refer to over-confidence or hu-
bris. Although we do not dispute the relevance of these personal traits for entrepreneurial de-
cision making, we find that the rational decision model is often too quickly discarded. 
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In a world, in which business planning is, by construction, useful, we were also able to obtain 
observations that have been used in empirical studies to question the value of planning. 
Hence, one must question the empirical validity of these studies. Even when the observations 
are statistically significant, we argue that the hypotheses can only be test appropriately, if the 
underlying samples are sufficient. As our analysis showed quite clearly, in order to test the 
value of business planning, the sample must include, beside successful ventures, market fail-
ures and disbanded projects. 
A major advantage of the rational decision model is its theoretical foundation, which enables 
one to analyze and understand complex interdependencies of entrepreneurial decision making 
that are sometimes even counterintuitive. The crucial aspect of this approach is the perspec-
tive of the analysis. In order to understand the entrepreneur’s decisions, one must see the 
world from his view. If one accepts that entrepreneurs behave rationally, which despite all 
their fascinating traits nevertheless appears to be plausible, it becomes much easier to influ-
ence their decisions and support their endeavors. 
The theoretical framework in which we derived our results was purposely kept as simple as 
possible to emphasize our results. However the model is flexible enough to include further 
aspects of the entrepreneurial process and allow further modifications of the entrepreneur’s 
decision context. Of particular interest is the interaction of the entrepreneur with providers of 
capital, as the latter are not only interested in the expected performance, but also want to share 
the resulting profits. How different modes of participation affect the value of planning and, 
thus, the entrepreneur’s planning effort are important aspects for future research. 
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